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Abstract 
As emerging states, India and South Africa have had the opportunity to engage with 
the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) norm-diffusion process, sporadically adopting dual 
roles as both “norm-takers” and “norm-shapers”, yet have struggled to robustly shape the 
normative direction of R2P. Crucially, attempts to adopt dual roles and effectively engage 
with the norm have become problematic by the way in which R2P has been conceptualised 
differently by both international and domestic actors at different times. This is due to the fact 
that the constitutive and regulative norm variants of R2P have often been fused together. This 
thesis firstly examines the emergence of R2P as a soft norm. Secondly, it accounts for how 
the norm has been diffused through using Amitav Acharya’s (2009) Constructivist 
‘constitutive localization’ model, illustrating how “norm-takers” (that are arguably aspiring 
“norm-shapers”) engage differently with the process of norm-diffusion. Then, through using 
a Constructivism that verges toward a critical postmodern approach, motivations for norm 
engagement are explored, which primarily are pioneered to satisfy socially constructed 
national interests. Finally, this is further substantiated through analysis of discussions 
surrounding potential military intervention into the Syrian Arab Republic from April 2011 
onwards.  
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Introduction  
The credibility and legitimacy of the R2P doctrine as an international norm is 
faltering, and is in jeopardy of becoming irrelevant following its exploitation during the Iraq 
Intervention in 2003 and Libyan Intervention in 2011 as well as the failure to respond 
robustly to the various humanitarian emergencies in Syria.
1
 According to the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), who are the accredited engineers 
of the norm, R2P is simply a means of ‘shifting the terms of the debate’, ‘from 
[understanding] sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility’ (2001, p. 16; 13). 
This implies that a state is obliged via a social contract to protect the dignity and welfare of 
its citizens from crimes of mass atrocity, namely: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. Failure to respect the first normative pillar, as stipulated by the 
2009 Report from the UN Secretary-General, invokes the second pillar, which relates to the 
duty of the international community to provide capacity-building assistance. Although R2P 
was engineered by ICISS in 2001 and unanimously adopted at the United Nations (UN) 
World Summit in 2005, many actors remain not wholly convinced by the norm. Particularly, 
towards the third and final pillar of R2P, which refers to the requirement to implement timely 
and decisive action; encompassing potential military intervention. Notably, Gareth Evans 
(2013) describes the norm’s current condition as being ‘down but not out.’ In order to 
resuscitate the norm, Ramesh Thakur (2011, 2013) and Thomas Weiss (2011, 2014) 
recommend engaging emerging states as “norm-shapers”.2 This thesis evaluates whether 
emerging states have been able to reproduce their own discourse and shape discussions 
regarding military intervention.  
Considered to be emerging states by their presence in the IBSA and BRICS acronyms 
as well as membership of the Group-20, analysis focuses on how India and South Africa have 
constructed perceptions of the third pillar of R2P.
3
 The third pillar, which refers to the ability 
                                                          
1
 Notably “norm” refers to ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors within a given identity’ 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). 
2
 While Jeffrey Checkel (1999) introduced the terms “norm-maker” and “norm-taker”, it is unclear 
who “norm-shaper” should be accredited to.  
3
 Whilst BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) refers to the acronym coined by Jim O’Neil, a 
Goldman Sachs employee, in 2001 as to account for the economic global shift (then without South 
Africa, who officially joined in April 2011), this thesis recognises the growing social and political 
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of the international community to use coercive force as a last resort, remains the most 
contentious aspect of the norm as it often infringes upon localised values. Characteristically, 
as the self-appointed leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), India has been a staunch 
critic of the third pillar as the norm compromises India’s preference for order by infringing 
upon understandings of the sacrosanctity of sovereignty. Notably, due to its international 
peacekeeping role (currently the third biggest contributor of UN troops, after Bangladesh and 
Pakistan), experience of post-colonial independence and ongoing conflict with Pakistan, India 
has belligerently insisted that discussions surrounding military intervention ought to be held 
strictly within the UN’s framework. Whereas, South Africa was formerly an R2P-enthusiast 
until a NATO-led force exceeded the mandate of Resolution 1973 supporting a no-fly zone 
into Libya in 2011, which to the horror of many, initiated regime change. This resulted in 
South Africa experiencing ‘buyers’ remorse’ (Welsh, 2012), ensuing national interests to be 
adapted accordingly. Jutta Weldes (1996, p. 280; 303) argues that national interests are 
socially constructed through the process of constitutive interpretation, ‘emerge out of 
representations’, and legitimacy ‘conferred in the process of their construction.’ Thereby, 
national interests are re-evaluated as domestic actors re-construct “regimes of truth”.4 This 
iterates the central argument of this thesis, that R2P has represented different discourses by 
actors at different times, which ensues problematic norm-engagement.  
This thesis will firstly account for the normative emergence of R2P. Secondly, its 
evolution will be evaluated through examining norm-diffusion models. Then, how India and 
South Africa differently engage with R2P will be explored through utilising a Constructivist 
framework. It is worth noting that by “India” and “South Africa”, this research refers to their 
respective socially constructed national interests, specifically as outlined by policy-makers 
and diplomats within domestic discussions, which are reproduced on the international stage 
to create their own respective national “regimes of truth”. Additionally, this research places 
itself within a qualitative epistemology, referring to the research process that evaluates how 
human behaviour shapes knowledge, analysing questions of “how” and “why”. Often, this 
approach verges toward critical postmodernism. Postmodernists reject the assertion that there 
is any form of absolute objective truth, thus providing the opportunity to decipher how 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
importance of these states in a multilateral world order. Notably, India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) 
was initiated on 6 June 2003 and aimed at strengthening South-South relations. 
4
 A Foucauldian principle, whereby each society produces its own discourse of truth as a result of 
power-relations constituted through the means of history, language and subjectivity.  
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agency and structure are mutually constituted through tracing the construction of power-
knowledge relations, rather than explaining causality. This critical analytical dimension is 
further strengthened through reflecting on these power-knowledge structures and analysing 
whose interests they serve. Whilst emerging states do attempt to shape the normative 
direction, attempts to effectively engage with the norm and the potential to create norm-
disjuncture have often become problematic as the constitutive and regulative norm variants of 
R2P are fused together. Finally, this will be demonstrated through analysing domestic 
discussions surrounding potential military intervention into Syria from 26 April 2011 
(marking its first appearance in the UN agenda). Whilst this incorporates the two states’ 
rotational period as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) (January 
2011 to December 2012), research will draw more broadly upon national historical 
experiences shaping the use of force discourse.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
s1474588 
January 2015 
7 
 
R2P Exposition  
R2P was formulated as a response to the failings of post-Cold War Humanitarian 
Interventionism, in an attempt to prevent the reoccurrence of any more “Rwandas” or 
“Kosovos”.5 The unpopularity of Humanitarian Interventionism was principally due to its 
contradictory conceptualisation, illustrated by its lexical formulation of “humanitarian” and 
“intervention”. This provoked fears that its case-by-case wording would encourage unilateral 
exploitation to serve non-humanitarian agendas, not unfounded considering the use of force 
in Kosovo, where the UNSC did not agree upon a resolution, yet military intervention is often 
perceived as just and necessary. Nicholas Wheeler (2000) argues that many interventions 
have been falsely justified in terms of humanitarianism and in turn tarnished the credibility of 
the norm; as evident by the 1971 Indian intervention into Eastern Pakistan, the 1978 
Tanzanian intervention into Uganda and 1979 Vietnamese intervention into Cambodia. 
Considered as an inherited norm from Nineteenth Century imperialists and soon endorsed to 
serve American Exceptionalism, Humanitarian Interventionism posed a direct threat to the 
conventional concept of state sovereignty, namely undermining principles of territorial 
integrity and non-intervention. 
Notably, the concept of human security developed in parallel to the failings of 
Humanitarian Interventionism, and influenced the initial formulation of R2P by ICISS. The 
human security paradigm links discourse relating to development, security of the individual 
and human rights, and refers to the freedom from want and fear. ICISS (2001, p. 13) placed 
‘human needs of those seeking protection’ at the centre of the interventionist discourse, 
shifting security concerns from conventional territorial interests associated with the Cold War 
to those relating to human security, subsequently explicitly engaging with the human rights 
discourse. This initially satisfied the calls from scholars such as Alex Bellamy (2003), who 
recommended reconceptualising ideals of humanitarianism and intervention so that the 
individuals in need became the point of departure. By re-conceptualising sovereignty in terms 
of responsibility, ICISS attempted to reconcile sovereignty with human rights in a post-
colonial world order (Bellamy, 2011; Thakur, 2011; Evans, 2008). However this initial 
normative shift was not reflected in the 2005 UN World Summit adoption of the norm, 
                                                          
5
 “Rwandas” refers to how the international response to the Rwandan Genocide in 1994 was too little 
and much too late; whereas “Kosovos” refers to the immediacy of action which bypassed the UNSC 
paralysed via veto in 1999.  
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presumably as the 2001 September 11 attacks and subsequent War on Terror affirmed 
security as equating to conventional understandings of sovereignty as namely territorial 
integrity and absolute authority. Bellamy (2009, p. 118) argues how these attempts to 
reconceptualise sovereignty in terms of responsibility (rather than in terms of equality as 
endorsed by the post-1945 international system), have constantly been undermined by the 
association of R2P to the “right to intervene” discourse synonymous with the Humanitarian 
Interventionism of the 1990s.  
Moreover, Oliver Stuenkel (2014, p. 11) observes how literature relating to the use of 
force tends to crudely differentiate between the ‘pro-interventionist Global North and a pro-
sovereignty Global South, together with the BRICS block’. This can be attributed to the fact 
that military intervention has often been deemed as representing - as Weiss (2004) worded - a 
‘Trojan horse’. Exhorting an appearance of humanitarian concern whilst concealing neo-
imperialist strategic interests; the legacy of the 2003 Iraq Invasion best demonstrates this 
perception.
6
 Whilst R2P does not alter pre-existing norms, rooting itself in international laws 
regarding the coercive use of force, when operationalised R2P directly violates conventional 
understandings of territorial integrity and sovereign independence. Notably, the third and 
final pillar of R2P stipulates that certain provisions ought to be met prior to implementation, 
consisting of six criteria which have been derived from Christian “Just War theory”.7 
Traditionally, the use of force for the defence of human rights has been challenged by legal 
and moral discussions, regarding issues of legitimacy and selectivity. In this sense, non-
adherence, as Aidan Hehir (2012, p. 207) argues, can be understood as being due to the 
misuse of the duty to intervene, rather than defending sovereignty as an absolute inviolability 
irreconcilable with Humanitarian Interventionism. This suggests that those more sympathetic 
with non-interventionist norms have been more antipathetic toward the third pillar of R2P. 
Whilst this has partly explained the existence of rejectionists (such as Cuba, Iran, Venezuela, 
Nicaragua and Sudan), it fails to coherently account for cautious, yet often outspoken post-
colonial dissenters, such as India and South Africa. Although understandings of sovereignty 
                                                          
6
 Initially justified on humanitarian grounds claiming that Saddam Hussein possessed Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, US-led forces bypassed the UNSC, finally resulting in regime change.  
7
 The use of force is legitimised by R2P if it can be justified in terms of: a just cause, has the right 
intention, is a last resort, will use proportionate means, has reasonable prospects and endorsed by a 
legitimate authority. 
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shape interventionist discourse, it does not explain India’s reluctance to explicitly challenge 
the norm nor South Africa’s inconsistent support. 
Robert Jackson (2007, p. 113), who adopts a pluralist approach, pragmatically 
accounts for inaction or failure to comply as being due to conflict between sovereignty and 
human rights; the survival of one set of people’s human rights are prioritised over another. 
Whereas Bellamy (2003, 2009) argues that the problem of norm-compliance resides in a 
sovereignty-centric conceptualisation of the norm itself. This complicates ‘political 
understanding’ (Chandler, 2009, p. 39) due to conflicting worldviews (Newman, 2013, p. 
236). Madhan Mohan Jaganathana and Gerrit Kurtz (2014, p. 480) explain how engagement 
‘depends on the priorities of its leaders and [in the case of India] how virtuously they manage 
to play the tune of sovereignty.’ This indicates that R2P is in a continuous state of norm-
diffusion and driven by the importance placed upon localised values by agency. Significantly, 
Thakur (2013, p. 73) emphasises the importance for ‘those emerging countries to seek to 
shape global normative guidelines rather than looking only to their own national ambitions.’ 
This suggests that when norm engagement occurs, it is driven by a self-interested desire to 
satisfy national interests, a notion mostly associated with Realism. According to Weldes’ 
(1996) theoretical approach, which complemented rather than challenged Realism, national 
interests should be understood as being socially constructed. This implies that norm 
engagement varies between and within states, according to their “regimes of truth”. Evidently 
conventional norm compliance discussions are, predictably and therefore unhelpfully, divided 
between the rationalists (emphasising material incentives and costs) and constructivists 
(focusing on norms and values). By transcending this dichotomy, greater attention can be 
placed on not ‘whether to act, but about how’ (Bellamy, 2011, p. 265), acknowledging that 
states have been united upon the objective to protect against mass atrocity crimes, but not the 
mechanisms.  
It is worth noting how India’s cautious approach toward R2P is popularly explained in 
terms of strategic interests to establish a smooth transition into a great power (Virk, 2013; 
Hall, 2013). Whereas localised approaches focus on the normative compatibility of the 
foreign and local values (Mohen, 2014). This accounts for the tension between R2P’s 
malleable conceptualisation of sovereignty and India’s insistence that sovereignty is an 
absolute right to non-intervention. Dipankar Banerjee (2012, p. 92) uses the seemingly 
irreconcilable nature of these two principles to demonstrate that India’s lack of positive norm 
engagement cannot be attributed to a lack of political will, but rather an ‘absence of 
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conviction’. In this sense, India’s approach to R2P, according to Urvashi Aneja (2014, p. 
239), can be perceived as an attempt to ‘contain assertive solidarism of R2P while 
maintaining a commitment to the responsibility of states to protect civilians.’ Thereby, the 
seeming ‘fixation’ upon sovereignty and non-intervention is illustrative of India’s pluralist 
‘preference for order’ (Jaganathana and Kurtz, 2014, p. 479). This is supported by India’s 
insistence upon legitimacy in discussions surrounding implementation (emphasising the six 
guiding principles), particularly the necessity to acquire consent from the host state so as to 
discourage unilateral behaviour. As a key peacekeeping contributor, it is unsurprising that 
India should insist on principles relating to legitimacy - and furthermore order - in 
discussions surrounding military intervention. As an emerging state, self-appointed leader of 
the NAM bloc as well as proud advocate of democracy and sovereignty as equality, India 
ought to have socially constructed a strong narrow approach to R2P, engaging with the norm 
to defend its values where it can.  
Moreover, the South African approach to R2P is similarly perplexing, given its 
commitment to advocating liberal values such as democracy and human rights, enthusiasm 
for peacekeeping, yet undermined by its ‘flip-flop foreign policy stance’ (Aboagye, 2012, p. 
41). Although South Africa was involved in the military interventions in Kosovo (1999) and 
Sudan (2004), it had not fully engaged with the military intervention discourse until it 
assumed a role as a non-permanent member of UNSC. In both 2007-2008 and 2011-2012 
rotations South Africa adopted a broad revisionist approach to Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
(which provides guidelines for peacekeeping), strategically to bolster UN support of regional 
African conflict management. However, the fluctuating approaches to discussions 
surrounding the third pillar of R2P (as reflected in its seeming inconsistent voting patterns in 
the UNSC), undermined its self-acclaimed title of defender of human rights. For instance, 
failure to condemn Zimbabwe and Myanmar for suppressing the right to protest, as well as 
constantly evolving perceptions of the intrastate conflicts in Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and Syria. 
Crucially, Festus Aboagye (2012) explains the South African approach as being influenced 
by a greater concern with conventional understanding of sovereignty than with human 
security. Whereas Tim Dunne and Faith Mabera (2013, p. 8) consider the problem as being 
produced from the tension between a local post-Apartheid position and a foreign policy that 
emphasises the vital necessity of fast response peacekeeping. In this sense, South Africa is 
precariously positioned between contradictory perceptions of itself and international 
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perceptions of its regional and international role. Furthermore, this becomes problematic by 
the ostensible commitment to liberal values. 
Unsurprisingly, R2P is deemed to be a Western norm, despite drawing from the 
African-developed principle of non-indifference. Notably, five years prior to the 2005 
endorsement of R2P non-indifference emerged and was adopted within the African region 
when the Organisation of African Unity Constitution was agreed upon (Sahnoun, 2009). Non-
indifference replaced non-interference, and refers to the duty to not allow mass atrocities to 
occur without a response; the rudimentary component of R2P. In addition to this, R2P 
developed upon the conceptualisation of sovereignty as responsibility initially pioneered by 
Robert Cohen and Francis Deng; the latter is a South Sudanese diplomat. Thakur (2013, p. 
72) argues that if R2P indeed initially represented a Western rebranding of Humanitarian 
Interventionism, then it would never have accumulated sufficient ‘traction’ when 
unanimously adopted at the 2005 World Summit. Nonetheless, it is vital to acknowledge, as 
Theresa Reinold (2013, p. 4) articulates, that the ‘power of norms’ and ‘norms of the 
powerful’ are two sides of the same coin, demonstrating that deconstructing power-
knowledge relations conveys whose interests are being served through norm-compliance.  
Furthermore, while describing how norm-diffusion literature heavily focuses upon 
successful and usually cosmopolitan norms, Jeffrey Checkel (1999, p. 4) indicates the failure 
to account for ‘the dog that didn’t bark’. Crucially, this thesis engages with a norm which 
potentially holds the capability to do so, but has wavered throughout the norm-diffusion 
process. Additionally, this thesis is inspired by and develops upon the insightful works that 
focus on culture and values in order to better understand the normative relevance of R2P to 
emerging states, such as that by Weiss and Rama Mani (2011) and Malte Brosig’s (2012) 
edited collection. Through accounting for R2P’s norm-emergence, it is evident that 
discussions surrounding military intervention remain contentious and tend to focus upon 
conflicting understandings of sovereignty, the legitimate use of force and human rights 
discourse. The unpopularity surrounding R2P norm compliance and lack of explicit 
codification within international law demonstrates that norm-diffusion is a fluid process; 
further indicating that R2P is a soft norm. Although most scholars (Bellamy, 2009; Wheeler 
and Egerton, 2009) accept that there is a difference between that initially proposed by ICISS 
and the watered-down 2005 World Summit endorsement (which Weiss (2006) denoted ‘R2P-
lite’); Evans (2008, p. 47) advocates that ‘it does not vary from core R2P principles in any 
significant way’. However, as this review of the literature conveys, the norm has represented 
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different discourses by actors at different times. Despite being a seemingly basic deduction, it 
is one that has caused problems in theoretical discussions as well as the practical 
implementation of the norm itself. Crucially then, R2P differs from its initial 2001 form from 
that in 2005, to that in Libya 2011 and now in 2015.  
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Norm-Diffusion: Socialisation and ‘Constitutive Localization’ 
Given that the previous section established why R2P emerged, it is now worth 
examining how R2P developed, through evaluating the norm-diffusion literature. Martha 
Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) account for three stages of normative evolution in 
their seminal norm life-cycle model. Firstly, the norm emerges as it is advocated by a norm-
entrepreneur and if socialisation is successful triggers the crucial tipping-point, indicating that 
the norm has accumulated traction. Once this is achieved, the norm proceeds into the 
acceptance stage, where the norm-cascade process occurs, and the norm is popularised. 
Finally, the norm is internalised through institutionalisation. Notably, placing R2P within this 
life-cycle model is difficult, as the norm fluctuates between norm-cascade and internalisation 
as popularity wavers. Norm development through socialisation is predicated upon 
“oughtness”, so that compliance of norm-takers is encouraged and inaction condemned by 
other states. Although R2P has become adopted into the international community’s 
vocabulary, it is not codified or bound in the UN Charter (rather it is used in accordance with 
Chapter VII), rendering it a soft norm. This suggests that R2P cannot be considered as an 
international hard norm, despite being treated as one through the scholarly attention it 
receives. Clearly, Finnemore and Sikkink’s top-down model is not wholly convincing given 
its one-way explanatory power and narrow focus upon norm-entrepreneurs, neglecting to 
account for the agency of norm-takers and norm-shapers as well as the existence of various 
forms of R2P.  
Amitav Acharya (2004, 2009) challenges conventional top-down models through 
focusing on the role of agency of norm-takers by asking ‘whose ideas matter?’, rather than 
which norms matter. Acharya (2009) predicates his ‘constitutive localization’ framework 
upon the understanding that norms that allow for this process, and subsequent congruence, 
are more likely to be successful.
 Acharya (2004, p. 245) defines ‘constitutive localization’ as 
the ‘active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting and cultural selection) of 
foreign ideas by local actors, which results in foreign ideas achieving congruence with local 
beliefs and practices.’ As new international norms emerge, which are often borrowed or 
inspired from former norms, the norm is diffused through the reputational powers of norm 
entrepreneurs. Finally, if ‘constitutive localization’ between the foreign and local is 
satisfactory, then congruence occurs. Whilst formulated in 2001 and unanimously endorsed 
in 2005, levels of congruence vary depending upon the ‘constitutive localization’ of norm-
takers, particularly with relation to localised understandings of Humanitarian 
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Interventionism, sovereignty and security. During the process of congruence, norm-takers are 
provided with the opportunity to become norm-shapers, as they hold the capacity to shape the 
normative direction. Notably, Pu Xiaoyu (2010, p. 346) explains how socialisation is central 
to the prospects of emerging states and therefore is a two-way process. Evidently, Acharya’s 
(2009) ‘constitutive localization’ accommodates for this by evaluating the interplay of agency 
between the localised role of norm-taker and norm-shaper. 
Although the language of R2P has been accepted into the international community’s 
vocabulary and its normative ideals rooted within pre-existing norms, its normative potential 
remains largely neglected. Acharya’s (2009) ‘constitutive localization’ model examines how 
R2P’s norm-diffusion has often been problematic as congruence is hindered by a clash 
between the foreign and local norms. A critical postmodernist reading of Constructivism 
provides the framework to decipher not which “regimes of truth” are more compelling, but 
rather provides the opportunity to explore the circumstances of how they came into existence 
through tracing the construction of power-knowledge relations. It is worth noting that 
‘theories should be explicitly committed to exposing and dismantling structures of 
domination and oppression’ (Reus-Smit, 2009, p. 217) or “regimes of truth”, as a means of 
creating a critical epistemology. Moreover, given the emphasis upon the role of agency and 
the evaluation of ‘the production of meaning as a type of influence’, Audie Klotz and Cecilia 
Lynch’s (2007, p. 52) two-tier framing-analysis approach will be utilised in order to 
effectively convey findings. Firstly, focus will be placed on how discourse is produced and, 
secondly, how this then impacts on subsequent behaviour.  
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Engaging with R2P: Tracing Norm-Diffusion Dynamics  
India and the Third Pillar of R2P: Reconciling the Irreconcilable  
Whilst India endorses the first two pillars of the norm, which relate to the 
responsibility a state has to protect its own citizens as well as the duty of the international 
community to provide capacity-building, it is reluctant to wholly comply with the third pillar, 
which encompasses potential use of military intervention. This is predominantly due to 
conflicting perceptions of the use of force and understandings of sovereignty. Notably 
domestic discussions heavily focus upon the conduct of intervention rather than the 
normative aspects, as R2P directly violates localised values synonymous with order.  
For instance, tension exists between the foreign norm’s legitimisation of the use of 
force and the localised preference for non-interventionist conflict-resolution. Indian policy-
makers tend to advocate a preference for non-violent localised solutions, often drawing upon 
the activism and philosophy of Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi (advocating non-violent means 
irrespective of outcomes). During the discussions regarding the 2011 Libyan Intervention, the 
Indian Permanent Representative to the UN, Manjeev Singh Puri, reproduced this discourse 
by asserting that ‘we deplore the use of force, which is totally unacceptable and must not be 
resorted to’ (S/PV.6498, 17 March 2011, p. 5). Through a process of framing, India 
emphasised the appropriate manner of implementing R2P. Puri encapsulates how issues of 
legitimacy and legality remain contingent and core to norm-diffusion when he asked ‘who 
watches the guardians?’ (S/PV.6531, 10 May 2011, p. 10). In addition to this, during the 
Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Report of the Secretary General (2012), Indian 
Permanent Representative to the UN, Hardeep Singh Puri, highlighted the utilisation of 
inappropriate phraseology within the 2009 report. He reminded the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) how this ‘normative framework cannot be changed at the Secretariat’s sweet will.’ 
Clearly, India has had the opportunity to engage and shape the normative direction of R2P, as 
its critical voice has attempted to define the appropriate contours for discussions relating to 
potential military intervention.  
During his statement to the Informal Interactive Dialogue of the UNGA on the 
Responsibility of States to Protect, Abhishek Singh (2014), who is a politician of the 
Bharatiya Janata Party, reminded the UN that R2P is not designed for regime change. By 
stressing the integrity of sovereignty within Chapter VII of the UN Charter and emphasising 
that the norm should only be invoked as a ‘last resort’ and crucially, under the ‘auspices’ of 
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the UN. Through a process of grafting, India advocates the integrity of the six guiding 
principles in order to emphasise the importance of sovereignty. The perceived sacrosanctity 
of absolute sovereignty has been central to deconstructing India’s engagement with R2P. By 
a process of cultural selection, India engineers robust support for the non-intervention 
principle as a pragmatic means of discouraging potential interference within its own borders. 
This indicates tension between sovereignty as responsibility, as advocated by the foreign 
norm, and sovereignty as equality, as locally endorsed. Following the experience of British 
colonial rule (1858-1947) and the decolonisation era, India adopted non-violence and non-
interventionist principles as a means of safeguarding its independence. 
Furthermore, pluralistic understandings of R2P have been scrutinised as Indian 
policy-makers grapple with the solidarist implication of being an emerging power. Former 
Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1947-64) reasserted that ‘we cannot shed the 
responsibility that go[es] with a great country’ (Banerjee, 2012, p. 227). As an emerging state 
with a historically vocal voice on the role of sovereignty and military intervention it is 
surprising - and disappointing - that India does not present an alternative normative option. 
Or at least directly challenge the relevance of the third pillar similar to the hard-lined 
approach that Indian Ambassador Ranendra “Ronen” Sen (2004-2009) adopted in the 
negotiations leading up to the 2005 World Summit; objecting to the patronising phrasing and 
neo-colonial implications. Additionally, during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first address 
to the UNGA (2014), he described how the philosophy “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” (roughly 
translating as “world family”) has historically guided India’s foreign policy, constructing 
ideals of multilateralism. This emphasises the Indian desire for open dialogue amongst a 
partnership of equally respected states. This reiterates the importance of principles of order, 
particularly sovereignty as equality. Whilst norm engagement occurs, with India often 
attempting to adopt dual roles as norm-taker and norm-shaper, India is reluctant to create 
norm-disjuncture, preferring to maintain equilibrium.  
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South Africa and the Third Pillar: Identity as Identity 
Since the 2011 Libyan Intervention, South Africa defected away from a pro-R2P 
solidarist position to an opposing pluralist discourse. Crucially, the sudden shift can be 
accredited to the fact that for South Africa ‘identity is [its] greatest asset’ (Verhoeven, 
Murthy and Soares de Oliveira, 2014, p. 527). R2P has been normatively attractive for South 
Africa as a regional power, particularly considering the seemingly liberal values and identity 
it has constituted from its historical experience of oppressive rule under Apartheid as well as 
Dutch (1652-1795 and 1803-6) and British (1795-1803, 1806-1902 and 1910-1961) colonial 
rule and imperial interference. South Africa’s shift in normative outlook illustrates clear norm 
engagement with R2P, but congruence is often hindered as conceptualisations of security and 
identity have clashed.  
Initially, R2P was compatible with the South African “regimes of truth”, as the 
norm’s emphasis upon non-indifference has been attuned with the values that South Africa 
has historically championed in a post-Apartheid world order; a commitment to defend human 
rights against authoritarian regimes. For South Africa, the regime change in Libya illustrates 
that R2P initially was a universal rather than Western norm, which had been abused through 
norm-diffusion (Verhoeven, Murthy and Soares de Oliveira, 2014, p. 511). Despite its 
membership to the African Union, which had rejected the use of force in Libya, as well as the 
seeming emerging bloc consensus to vote otherwise prior to the UNSC vote, South Africa 
voted in favour of Resolution 1973 in line with the other African non-permanent members of 
the UNSC, Gabon and Nigeria. The resolution was contingent with South African national 
interests, partially because it was perceived to be an African problem. Notably, the South 
African Permanent Representative to the UN Baso Sangqu emphasised the denunciation of 
‘any foreign occupation or unilateral military intervention under the pretext of protecting 
civilians’ (S/PV.6498, 17 March 2011, p. 10). However, the President of South Africa Jacob 
Zuma did not become a vocal critic explicitly because of discontent towards the overt 
militarisation of the mandate. On the contrary, the South African defence policy endorses 
legitimised violence as an accompaniment to diplomatic dialogue and locally led solutions. 
South Africa condemned how the ‘implementation of these resolutions appears to go beyond 
their letter and spirit’ (S/PV.6531, 10 May 2011, p. 18), as the norm was invoked against the 
wishes of a “functioning state”. Thereby, the third pillar of R2P was discredited as the 
intervention was perceived as French, American and British forces simply “settling scores” 
with Colonel Gaddafi.  
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This suggests that it is the varying and often conflicting perceptions of South African 
national identity that has undermined processes of congruence, between the external 
expectations of its behaviour in the current world order as an emerging state and its own 
national perceptions. South African national interests reflect aspirations to be perceived as a 
responsible state given its de facto regional power status and “commitment” to liberal values. 
These are often contradicted by the difficulty experienced by national policy-makers to 
reconcile conventional national security with human security. Daniel Wagner and Daniel 
McLaughlin (2013) explain how the ‘government has at times chosen to overlook human 
rights abuses in order to promote the notion of Pan-Africanism.’  
Evidently, South Africa’s approach to R2P is puzzling. Whilst policy-makers attempt 
to embody the value of human rights in its international identity, its inconsistent and selective 
implementation of R2P undermines this. Moreover, its post-Apartheid foreign policy is 
compatible with R2P, yet its anticolonial experiences and aspirations for regional leadership 
complicate its own conceptualisation of how the third pillar should be perceived. Despite an 
unsuccessful attempt at norm grafting, South Africa has engaged with the third pillar of R2P 
through reframing its “regimes of truth” in light of the experiences of the Libyan 
Intervention. This suggests that norm compliance is determined by how South African 
policy-makers define security, with relation to human rights.  
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The Constitutive and the Regulative Norm Variant 
By asking ‘whose ideas matter?’, Acharya’s (2009) ‘constitutive localization’ model 
has reiterated that engagement with R2P matters significantly to emerging states as a means 
of creating legitimacy. Whilst it is clear that actors are motivated to shape norm-diffusion for 
reasons ranging from idealism to pragmatism, they are not mutually exclusive as attempts 
seek to satisfy socially constructed national interests. Moreover, by demonstrating how 
“regimes of truth” are produced, analysis has conveyed that through pursuit of national 
interests Indian and South African perceptions of R2P tends to fuse the two norm variants 
together. Thereby, combining the constitutive (which defines an identity) with the regulative 
(which advocates certain standards and tends to be institutionalised within international law) 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). This implies that regulative conceptualisations 
relating to the third pillar are often undermined by the constitutive variant; exposing the 
tension between the foreign norm and socially constructed national interests. For instance, 
consider how Indian norm engagement with R2P is determined by values synonymous with 
order, whereas South African engagement is determined by conflicting conceptualisations of 
security, specifically that relating to human rights. Crucially, the fusion of both constitutive 
and regulative conceptualisations of the norm during the process of norm-diffusion has 
complicated attempts to adopt dual roles as both norm-taker as well as norm-shaper. 
Considering that it is clear how discourse is produced by these two emerging states, it is now 
worth evaluating how this then impacts subsequent behaviour.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
s1474588 
January 2015 
20 
 
Norm Engagement in the Syrian Crisis  
The Syrian Crisis has been noted as beginning in March 2011 when Bashar Al-
Assad’s regime violently cracked-down on anti-governmental protesters. Since then, the 
intrastate conflict over territorial control has become an unprecedented series of humanitarian 
crises. This has been exacerbated by escalating violence (including the presence of the 
terrorist group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)) and human rights violations (including 
torture and forced disappearance) between the government and various rebel groups, causing 
an influx of refugees to the rest of the region. Nonetheless, the international community have 
been unwilling to implement the third pillar of R2P, relating to potential military 
intervention. Notably, India and South Africa, as emerging states, remain cautious with 
regard to engaging with elements of the norm, rather than the norm itself. Significantly, as 
constitutive and regulative conceptualisations of the norm are fused together, attempts by 
these emerging states to procure a robust dual role as norm-taker and norm-shaper become 
problematic. 
IBSA Dialogue Forum’s initial engagement with the Syrian Crisis attempted to 
pioneer an alternative response positioned between the non-interference stance adopted by 
Russia and China and the interventionism favoured by the remaining UNSC’s Permanent 
Three. Initially, this seemed a promising means for emerging states to influence the 
discourse, particularly considering the underpinning principles of IBSA; notably the respect 
for human rights, the rule of law, democracy as well as attempts to strengthen 
multilateralism. Whilst the trilateral two day negotiations in October 2011 represented a 
viable preventative-diplomacy approach, IBSA’s abstention from the UNSC’s vote on the 
draft resolution (S/2011/612, 4 October 2011) undermined the forum’s potential as norm-
shapers. ‘By abstaining, India… and South Africa have failed the Syrian people and 
emboldened the Syrian government in its path of violence against them’, the deputy Middle 
East director at Human Rights Watch (2011) continued to explain how, ‘their proclaimed 
distrust of the Western motives shouldn’t blind them into siding with an abusive government. 
Syria’s current behaviour repudiates the very democratic ideals to which IBSA countries are 
committed.’ Despite limited success as the attempt lacked normative standing, these 
emerging states engaged with R2P as both norm-takers and norm-shapers, through attempting 
to construct an alternative discourse devoid of their own perceived normative flaws of the 
third pillar. This constructivist process of social learning illustrates how experiences of the 
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Libyan Intervention perpetuated motivations for norm-engagement and have been 
underpinned by the concern that the norm might again be abused or misinterpreted.  
For instance, the South African Ambassador Sangqu partially justified the South 
African abstention from the draft resolution on 4 October 2011 (which called for Assad to 
abdicate) by explicitly stating it appears to be ‘designed as a prelude to further actions’ 
(South African Representative UN, 2011). Clearly, there was a concern that an invocation of 
Article 41 would escalate into Article 42, as experienced in Libya.
8
 Subsequently, South 
Africa advocated a discourse that insisted on the necessity to acquire what the response to 
Libya lacked: a ‘robust posture’ (S/PV.6531, 10 May 2011, p. 17). Similarly to Bellamy 
(2014), Justin Morris (2013, p. 1280) explains how ‘R2P was rarely cited by UNSC members 
during debates.’ This may be true in terms of actors explicitly discussing the norm, but 
implicit references to the sentiment of the norm were utilised. For instance, consider how 
Sanqu emphasised South African concern during the UNSC Open Debate on Protection of 
Civilians (2011, p. 2) regarding the ‘impartiality of UN forces being compromised.’ 
Evidently, South Africa initially engaged with the third pillar of R2P in the discussions 
surrounding military intervention in the Syria Crisis following the abuse of the norm in 
Libya. However attempts at norm-engagement became sporadic and lacked normative 
standing as policy-makers struggled to reconcile different conceptualisations of security. 
Bellamy and Williams (2012, p. 289) explain how comparatively the threat presented in 
Libya was very clear resulting in few strategic options, in comparison to the case in Syria 
which witnessed disagreement over the very nature of the crisis. Evaluated within the broader 
context of events, specifically the Arab Spring, it is clear how the constitutive and regulative 
norm variants could be fused together, particularly in the case of India.  
The “Arab Spring” denotes the political, social and economic upheavals experienced 
since December 2010 in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and has impacted Syria, and 
crucially been fuelled by aspirations for democratisation. Despite being an emerging 
democracy, Indian diplomats seem particularly reluctant to support democracy promotion in 
other states; with the exception of the 1971 intervention into Eastern Pakistan and opposition 
                                                          
8
 Within Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Article 41 refers to the UNSC’s capacity to request member 
states to utilise non-military measures (such as economic sanctions). Article 42 outlines its ability to 
resort to military measures if the former attempts are seen to be inadequate means of maintaining 
international peace and security. 
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to South African Apartheid. In alignment with the NAM bloc position, as illustrated by the 
statement provided by the former Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh (2004-2014), at 
the Sixteenth NAM Summit (2012), India and South Africa ‘supports popular aspirations for 
a democratic and pluralistic order. Nevertheless, such transformations cannot be prompted by 
external intervention, which exacerbate the suffering of ordinary citizens.’ Moreover, during 
the statement given by Sushma Swaraj, who is the Indian External Affairs Minister, at the 
International Conference on Syria (2014) she added that ‘countries have the right to choose 
their own destiny and decide their own future.’ Evidently, the normative variant relating to its 
own national “regimes of truth” undermined the regulative understanding of the norm, 
furthermore discouraging engagement with the third pillar of R2P.  
Notably, the sectarian dimension of the conflict helps to understand the circumstances 
surrounding how Indian policy-makers have at times become muted, subsequently 
disappointing external expectations (predominantly from Western civil society) associated 
with being an emerging state. Sunni and Shia Muslims constitute large portions of India’s 
population and have historically clashed in the Northern states, especially Jammu and 
Kashmir. In this sense Indian policy-makers are encouraging non-interference in order to not 
provoke any form of upsurge in violence in its own troubled frontiers in Kashmir and the 
North-East; thereby India is keen to not set a precedent. Moreover, this partially explains why 
India has adopted a cautious position as not to seem to be siding with either Saudi Arabia 
(Sunni) or the Assad regime (Shia), especially as Iran is asserting pressure upon India to 
adopt a more assertive role in the region. This has been further exacerbated by the role of 
terrorist groups in the region, including Al-Qaeda and more recently ISIS, who declared a 
caliphate state. Therefore, this discourse socially constituted the Indian national interest to 
seek a resolution that maintained the equilibrium, and subsequently impacted the voting 
behaviour of India in UNSC. India has had to pragmatically consider the ‘Arab world that 
will [eventually] emerge from the debris of the Arab Spring’ (Fazzur Rahman Siddigui, 2012, 
p. 9). As South Africa is not in the direct neighbouring region of Syria, its national interest 
stakes are not as high, thereby norm-engagement has not been as highly anticipated.  
Furthermore, the Syrian Crisis has been dramatically exacerbated by the events in 
August 2013, when sarin gas was allegedly used in Ghouta against civilians but it remains 
unclear which group is responsible. It was at this point that discussion surrounding military 
intervention peaked, worrying many actors that a Western response would be designed to 
punish the regime, rather than protect civilians. In a statement by Ebrahim Ebrahim, the 
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Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation (2013), the South African 
position on the use of chemical weapons was clearly established. He insisted that despite the 
‘deplorable’ nature, it ought not to ‘detract from the larger picture of finding a sustainable 
resolution to the conflict in Syria, which should remain the primary focus.’ Expressing South 
African fear of unilateral behaviour, Ebrahim continued by maintaining that ‘the UN 
Inspectors are uniquely placed to independently establish the facts in an objective and 
impartial manner’. Further illustrated in the address titled ‘Let Peace Reign’ (2013) during 
the 59th Commonwealth Conference in Johannesburg, Zuma asserted that ‘we trust that there 
shall be no violation of international law or the abuse of the UNSC to fulfil the agenda of 
other nation states’. This explicitly referred to previous exploitation of the use of force for 
humanitarian cause, subsequently engaging with the third pillar of R2P.  
Furthermore, India responded with a strong assertion that emphasised its preference 
for order. During the Opening of the 68
th
 Session of the UNGA (2013, p. 19) it was asserted 
that ‘the use of chemical weapons, whosoever may have deployed them, must be condemned 
in the strongest terms... There is no military solution to this conflict.’ This cautious wording 
illustrates India’s insistence for concrete evidence prior to any form of action. Additionally, 
the carefully worded response highlights how India has high geopolitical and socio-economic 
stakes in the conflict itself. Simply, ‘India [was] torn between [the] Syria[n] ‘red line’ and oil 
prices’ (Kasturi, 2013). The concern that potential ‘fallout’ (Roy, 2013) could lead to 
asymmetrical warfare was exacerbated by concern for the welfare of its Indian compatriots in 
the Gulf region. However, despite offering financial and technical services to the 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, India was surprisingly quiet in the 
events following August 2013 on the international stage, especially considering its stakes in 
the conflict and traditionally critical voice when discussing the use of force.  
Notably, concerns relating to the use of force were clearly accommodated into the 
second draft of the UNSC resolution (S/2012/77, 4 February 2012), which condemned all 
violence regardless of source, excluded reference to Chapter VII and demanded adherence to 
the Arab-League action plan; this re-draft secured thirteen positive votes, including India and 
South Africa. Clearly norm-takers were effectively engaged with R2P and became norm-
shapers, given the opportunity to influence discussions surrounding military intervention. 
However, ultimately, this resolution was vetoed by China and Russia. On the one hand, it can 
be perceived that emerging states strived to become norm-shapers but were undermined by a 
problem within the international structure itself, especially the use of the veto. On the other 
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hand, emerging states were able to do so in the safety of knowing that ultimately it would be 
vetoed. Either way, norm-engagement with R2P occurred. However, as emerging states, 
norm-engagement throughout the Syrian Crisis has been minimal and lacked normative 
standing.  
Strategically, emerging states by nature are expected to engage with normative ideals 
and laws in order to procure further legitimacy and credibility. It is worth noting how Brazil 
engaged with the perceived Libyan Intervention failings and suggested a peacekeeping 
paradigm that focuses on the Responsibility While Protecting (RWP), which emphasises the 
importance of sovereignty, non-interventionism and accountability. Amit Chaudhuri (2013) 
argues that RWP has achieved what India was incapable of articulating: an alternative that is 
not doused in language of sovereignty. Both India and South Africa enthusiastically 
embraced their fellow BRICS’ suggestion, as it addressed the core problems they associate 
with R2P, predominantly accountability. Nonetheless, it does not represent an alternative but 
rather a complementary paradigm, as it does not address the conceptual issues related to the 
third pillar.  
In alignment with the NAM bloc position, both India and South Africa have 
continuously supported dialogue and favoured preventative conflict-resolution, which 
emphasised Chapter VI of the UN Charter. For instance, Kofi Annan’s Six Point Plan, which 
presents a roadmap for peace that does not include Assad abdicating. While the Geneva 
Communiques (Geneva Peace Talks) have represented a viable alternative, diplomacy has 
become deadlocked due to the political unwillingness of the actors involved within the Syrian 
Crisis. Therefore, throughout the Syrian Crisis emerging states have been unable to provide 
an alternative and challenge R2P, as the constitutive and regulative variants of the norm have 
become integrated. In the case of South Africa, norm-engagement with R2P has been 
underpinned by conflicting conceptualisations of security, between national and human 
rights, as well as self-perception insecurities. Whereas, as The Hindu (2014) reported, 
‘India’s voice …lost its timbre’, given that India voted alongside Western powers against the 
Assad regime, which was ultimately vetoed by Russia and China, yet siding with its emerging 
power counterparts on others.  
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Conclusions  
Thakur (2011, 2013) and Weiss (2011, 2014) recommended that in order to protect 
the credibility of R2P, norm-takers ought to adapt to become norm-shapers. This sentiment 
was evaluated through examining whether India and South Africa as emerging states have 
been able to reproduce their own “regimes of truth” in order to shape the direction of R2P. 
Whilst both emerging states have preferred to emphasise prevention and regional solutions 
over military intervention, they have sporadically engaged with R2P as both norm-takers and 
norm-shapers. Nonetheless, both have struggled to robustly shape R2P’s norm-diffusion and 
direct discussions surrounding the third and final pillar of R2P. This can be accredited to the 
fact that understandings of R2P are determined by ever-changing socially constructed 
national interests. 
Through accounting for why R2P emerged as a norm and subsequent diffusion as a 
soft norm, contentious factors within the discussions surrounding military intervention were 
highlighted, namely: understandings of security, questions of legitimacy and the appropriate 
role for human rights discourse. This led to the deduction which forms part of the central 
argument of this thesis that the norm has represented different discourses by actors at 
different times. Then, the question of how R2P emerged was addressed, by examining norm-
diffusion models. Acharya’s (2009) ‘constitutive localization’ model helped to analyse two-
way engagement between norm and norm-taker within the broader normative process, by 
accounting for normative clashes between the foreign and local ideas. Through combining 
this with a critical postmodernist theoretical framework, analysis deconstructed power-
knowledge relations in order to evaluate the circumstances of how “regimes of truth” have 
been constituted. This was demonstrated through utilising Klotz and Lynch’s (2007) two tier 
methodology, which first evaluated the production of discourse and how it then impacted 
upon subsequent behaviour. It was advocated that attempts to acquire a dual role as both 
norm-taker and norm-shaper have been complicated by the fact that R2P has been 
conceptualised by Indian and South African policy-makers in terms of two different, often 
contradictory, norm variants.  
This argument was then substantiated through analysing its occurrence within 
discussions surrounding potential military intervention into Syria from April 2011. It was 
established that although India accepts sovereignty as a duty to respond, it cannot reconcile 
sovereignty as responsibility with sovereignty as equality. Notably, whilst both experienced 
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colonial rule, South Africa had been an avid supporter of the norm, despite neo-imperial 
connotations. In this sense, internalisation problems occur because tension is created 
regarding the conceptualisation of security; between human security and that of conventional 
national security. For South Africa, the conceptualisation of security within its self-perceived 
national identity is central to understanding its sporadic engagement. Whilst India has 
remained relatively consistent in its critique of the norm, its voting behaviour does not reflect 
an actor explicitly attempting to create norm-disjuncture. However, it is worth noting that 
voting against UNSC resolutions would be perceived as opposing attempts to halt mass 
atrocities. Whilst there is evidence that emerging states do, at times, fluctuate between the 
role of norm-taker and norm-shaper, attempts to shape discourse are structurally limited, 
particularly since the end of the UNSC rotational period, limiting the direct influence they 
feasibly have on discussions surrounding the third pillar. Therefore, through tracing and 
examining the processes of norm diffusion and to what extents India and South Africa have 
engaged with R2P, this thesis has addressed how India and South Africa have had the 
capability and opportunity to engage and shape the normative direction of the third pillar. 
Whilst emerging states have engaged with the norm-diffusion process in the case of Syria, 
albeit with limited success, ultimately they hold potential to shape processes of norm-
diffusion. Meanwhile, the limited norm-engagement indicates that R2P is in grave jeopardy 
of becoming a non-international non-norm. 
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